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Abstract. When deliberating about what to do, an autonomous agent must gen-
erate and consider the relative pros and cons of the different options. The situation
becomes even more complicated when an agent is involved in a joint deliberation,
as each agent will have its own preferred outcome which may change as new
information is received from the other agents involved in the deliberation. We
present an argumentation-based dialogue system that allows agents to come to an
agreement on how to act in order to achieve a joint goal. The dialogue strategy
that we define ensures that any agreement reached is acceptable to each agent,
but does not necessarily demand that the agents resolve or share their differing
preferences. We give properties of our system and discuss possible extensions.
ACM Category: I.2.11 Multiagent systems. General terms: Theory.
Keywords: dialogue, argumentation, agreement, strategy, deliberation, action.
1 Introduction
When agents engage in dialogues their behaviour is influenced by a number of factors
including the type of dialogue taking place (e.g. negotiation or inquiry), the agents’
own interests within the dialogue, and the other parties participating in the dialogue.
Some of these aspects have been recognised in Walton and Krabbe’s characterisation
of dialogue types [1]. Some types of dialogue are more adversarial than others. For
example, in a persuasion dialogue an agent may try to force its opponent to contradict
itself, thus weakening the opponent’s position. In a deliberation dialogue, however, the
agents are more co-operative as they each share the same goal to establish agreement,
although individually they may wish to influence the outcome in their own favour.
We present a dialogue system for deliberation that allows agents to reason and ar-
gue about what to do to achieve some joint goal but does not require them to pool their
knowledge, nor does it require them to aggregate their preferences. Few existing dia-
logue systems address the problem of deliberation ([2, 3] are notable exceptions). Ours
is the first system for deliberation that provides a dialogue strategy that allows agents
to come to an agreement about how to act that each is happy with, despite the fact that
they may have different preferences and thus may each be agreeing for different rea-
sons; it couples a dialectical setting with formal methods for argument evaluation and
allows strategic manoeuvring in order to influence the dialogue outcome. We present an
analysis of when agreement can and cannot be reached with our system; this provides
an essential foundation to allow us to explore mechanisms that allow agents to come to
an agreement in situations where the system presented here may fail.
We assume that agents are co-operative in that they do not mislead one another
and will come to an agreement wherever possible; however, each agent aims to satisfy
its own preferences. For the sake of simplicity, here we present a two party dialogue;
however, the assumed co-operative setting means that many of the difficult issues which
normally arise with multi party dialogues (e.g. [4]) are avoided here. We believe it
to be straightforward to extend the system to allow multiple participants, for example
following the approach taken in [5].
We describe the setting envisaged through a characteristic scenario. Consider a sit-
uation where a group of colleagues is attending a conference and they would all like to
go out for dinner together. Inevitably, a deliberation takes place where options are pro-
posed and critiqued and each individual will have his own preferences that he wishes
to be satisfied by the group’s decision. It is likely that there will be a range of differ-
ent options proposed that are based on criteria such as: the type of cuisine desired; the
proximity of the restaurant; the expense involved; the restaurant’s capacity; etc.
To start the dialogue one party may put forward a particular proposal, reflecting his
own preferences, say going to a French restaurant in the town centre. Such an argument
may be attacked on numerous grounds, such as it being a taxi ride away, or it being
expensive. If expense is a particular consideration for some members of the party, then
alternative options would have to be proposed, each of which may have its own merits
and disadvantages, and may need to consider the preferences already expressed. We can
see that in such a scenario the agents , whilst each having their own preferred options,
are committed to finding an outcome that everyone can agree to.
We present a formal argumentation-based dialogue system to handle joint delib-
eration. In section 2 we present the reasoning mechanism through which agents can
construct and propose arguments about action. In section 3 we define the dialogue sys-
tem and give an example dialogue. In section 4 we present an analysis of our system
and in section 5 we discuss important extensions. In section 6 we discuss related work,
and we conclude the paper in section 7.
2 Practical arguments
We now describe the model of argumentation that we use to allow agents to reason about
how to act. Our account is based upon a popular approach to argument characterisation,
whereby argumentation schemes and critical questions are used as presumptive justifi-
cation for generating arguments and attacks between them [6]. Arguments are generated
by an agent instantiating a scheme for practical reasoning which makes explicit the fol-
lowing elements: the initial circumstances where action is required; the action to be
taken; the new circumstances that arise through acting; the goal to be achieved; and the
social value promoted by realising the goal in this way. The scheme is associated with
a set of characteristic critical questions (CQs) that can be used to identify challenges
to proposals for action that instantiate the scheme. An unfavourable answer to a CQ
will identify a potential flaw in the argument. Since the scheme makes use of what are
termed as ‘values’, this caters for arguments based on subjective preferences as well
as more objective facts. Such values represent qualitative social interests that an agent
wishes (or does not wish) to uphold by realising the goal stated [7].
To enable the practical argument scheme and critical questions approach to be pre-
cisely formalised for use in automated systems, in [8] it was defined in terms of an
Action-based Alternating Transition System (AATS) [9], which is a structure for mod-
elling game-like multi-agent systems where the agents can perform actions in order to
attempt to control the system in some way. Whilst the formalisms given in [8, 9] are
intended to represent the overall behaviour of a multi-agent system and the effects of
joint actions performed by the agents, we are interested in representing the knowledge
of individual agents within a system. Hence, we use an adaptation of their formalisms
(first presented in [5]) to define a Value-based Transition System (VATS) as follows.
Definition 1: A Value-based Transition System (VATS), for an agent x, denoted Sx,
is a 9-tuple 〈Qx, qx0 , Acx, Avx, ρx, τx, Φx, pix, δx〉 s.t.:
Qx is a finite set of states;
qx0 ∈ Q
x is the designated initial state;
Acx is a finite set of actions;
Avx is a finite set of values;
ρx : Acx 7→ 2Q
x
is an action precondition function, which for each action a ∈ Acx
defines the set of states ρ(a) from which a may be executed;
τx : Qx × Acx 7→ Qx is a partial system transition function, which defines the state
τx(q, a) that would result by the performance of a from state q—n.b. as this function is
partial, not all actions are possible in all states (cf. the precondition function above);
Φx is a finite set of atomic propositions;
pix : Qx 7→ 2Φ
x
is an interpretation function, which gives the set of primitive proposi-
tions satisfied in each state: if p ∈ pix(q), then this means that the propositional variable
p is satisfied (equivalently, true) in state q; and
δx : Qx × Qx × Avx 7→ {+,−,=} is a valuation function, which defines the status
(promoted (+), demoted (−), or neutral (=)) of a value v ∈ Avx ascribed by the agent
to the transition between two states: δx(q, q′, v) labels the transition between q and q′
with respect to the value v ∈ Avx.
Note, Qx = ∅ ↔ Acx = ∅ ↔ Avx = ∅ ↔ Φx = ∅.
Given its VATS, an agent can now instantiate the practical reasoning argument
scheme in order to construct arguments for (or against) actions to achieve a particu-
lar goal because they promote (or demote) a particular value.
Definition 2: An argument constructed by an agent x from its VATS Sx is a 4-tuple
A = 〈a, p, v, s〉 s.t.: qx = qx0 ; a ∈ Ac
x; τx(qx, a) = qy; p ∈ pix(qy); v ∈ Avx;
δx(qx, qy, v) = s where s ∈ {+,−}.
We define the functions: Act(A) = a; Goal(A) = p; Val(A) = v; Sign(A) = s.
If Sign(A) = +(−resp.), then we say A is an argument for (against resp.) action a.
We denote the set of all arguments an agent x can construct from Sx as Argsx; we
let Argsxp = {A ∈ Argsx | Goal(A) = p}.
The set of values for a set of arguments X is defined as Vals(X ) = {v | A ∈
X and Val(A) = v}.
If we take a particular argument for an action, it is possible to generate attacks on
that argument by posing the various CQs related to the practical reasoning argument
scheme. In [8], details are given of how the reasoning with the argument scheme and
posing CQs is split into three stages: problem formulation, where the agents decide on
the facts and values relevant to the particular situation under consideration; epistemic
reasoning, where the agents determine the current situation with respect to the struc-
ture formed at the previous stage; and action selection, where the agents develop, and
evaluate, arguments and counter arguments about what to do. Here, we assume that the
agents’ problem formulation and epistemic reasoning are sound and that there is no
dispute between them relating to these stages; hence, we do not consider the CQs that
arise in these stages. That leaves CQ5-CQ11 for consideration (as numbered in [8]):
CQ5: Are there alternative ways of realising the same consequences?
CQ6: Are there alternative ways of realising the same goal?
CQ7: Are there alternative ways of promoting the same value?
CQ8: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes the value?
CQ9: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes some other value?
CQ10: Does doing the action promote some other value?
CQ11: Does doing the action preclude some other action which would promote some
other value?
We do not consider CQ5 or CQ11 further, as the focus of the dialogue is to agree to
an action that achieves the goal; hence, the incidental consequences (CQ5) and other po-
tentially precluded actions (CQ11) are of no interest. We focus instead on CQ6-CQ10;
agents participating in a deliberation dialogue use these CQs to identify attacks on pro-
posed arguments for action. These CQs generate a set of arguments for and against
different actions to achieve a particular goal, where each argument is associated with
a motivating value. To evaluate the status of these arguments we use a Value Based
Argumentation Framework (VAF), introduced in [7]. A VAF is an extension of the ar-
gumentation frameworks (AF) of Dung [10]. In an AF an argument is admissible with
respect to a set of arguments S if all of its attackers are attacked by some argument in
S, and no argument in S attacks an argument in S. In a VAF an argument succeeds in
defeating an argument it attacks only if its value is ranked as high, or higher, than the
value of the argument attacked; a particular ordering of the values is characterised as
an audience. Arguments in a VAF are admissible with respect to an audience A and
a set of arguments S if they are admissible with respect to S in the AF which results
from removing all the attacks which are unsuccessful given the audience A. A maximal
admissible set of a VAF is known as a preferred extension.
Although VAFs are commonly defined abstractly, here we give an instantiation in
which we define the attack relation between the arguments. Condition 1 of the following
attack relation allows for CQ8 and CQ9; condition 2 allows for CQ10; condition 3 al-
lows for CQ6 and CQ7. Note that attacks generated by condition 1 are not symmetrical,
whilst those generated by conditions 2 and 3 are.
Definition 3: An instantiated value-based argumentation framework (iVAF) is de-
fined by a tuple 〈X ,A〉 s.t. X is a finite set of arguments andA ⊂ X ×X is the attack
relation. A pair (Ai, Aj) ∈ A is referred to as “Ai attacks Aj” or “Aj is attacked by
Ai”. For two arguments Ai = 〈a, p, v, s〉, Aj = 〈a′, p′, v′, s′〉 ∈ X , (Ai, Aj) ∈ A iff
p = p′ and either:
1. a = a′, s = − and s′ = +; or
2. a = a′, v 6= v′ and s = s′ = +; or
3. a 6= a′ and s = s′ = +.
An audience for an agent x over the values V is a binary relation Rx ⊂ V × V that
defines a total order over V . We say that an argument Ai is preferred to the argument
Aj in the audience Rx, denoted Ai x Aj , iff (Val(Ai), (Val(Aj)) ∈ Rx. If Rx is an
audience over the values V for the iVAF 〈X ,A〉, then Vals(X ) ⊆ V .
We use the term audience here to be consistent with the literature, it does not refer
to the preference of a set of agents; rather, we define it to represent a particular agent’s
preference over a set of values.
Given an iVAF and a particular agent’s audience, we can determine acceptability of
an argument as follows. Note that if an attack is symmetric, then an attack only succeeds
in defeat if the attacker is more preferred than the argument being attacked; however,
as in [7], if an attack is asymmetric, then an attack succeeds in defeat if the attacker is
at least as preferred as the argument being attacked.
Definition 4: Let Rx be an audience and let 〈X ,A〉 be an iVAF.
For (Ai, Aj) ∈ A s.t. (Aj , Ai) 6∈ A, Ai defeats Aj underRx if Aj 6x Ai.
For (Ai, Aj) ∈ A s.t. (Aj , Ai) ∈ A, Ai defeats Aj underRx if Ai x Aj .
An argument Ai ∈ X is acceptable w.r.t S under Rx (S ⊆ X ) if: for every Aj ∈ X
that defeats Ai underRx, there is some Ak ∈ S that defeats Aj under Rx.
A subset S of X is conflict-free under Rx if no argument Ai ∈ S defeats another
argument Aj ∈ S under Rx.
A subset S of X is admissible underRx if: S is conflict-free in Rx and every A ∈ S is
acceptable w.r.t S underRx.
A subset S of X is a preferred extension under Rx if it is a maximal admissible set
underRx.
An argument A is acceptable in the iVAF 〈X ,A〉 under audience Rx if there is some
preferred extension containing it.
We have now defined a mechanism with which an agent can determine attacks be-
tween arguments for and against actions, and can then use an ordering over the values
that motivate such arguments (its audience) in order to determine their acceptability. In
the next section we define our dialogue system.
3 Dialogue system
The communicative acts in a dialogue are called moves. We assume that there are always
exactly two agents (participants) taking part in a dialogue, each with its own identifier
taken from the set I = {1, 2}. Each participant takes it in turn to make a move to the
other participant. We refer to participants using the variables x and x such that: x is 1
if and only if x is 2; x is 2 if and only if x is 1.
Move Format
open 〈x, open, γ〉
assert 〈x, assert, A〉
agree 〈x, agree, a〉
close 〈x, close, γ〉
Table 1. Format for moves used in deliberation dialogues: γ is a goal; a is an action; A is an
argument; x ∈ {1, 2} is an agent identifier.
A move in our system is of the form 〈Agent, Act, Content〉. Agent is the identifier
of the agent generating the move, Act is the type of move, and the Content gives the
details of the move. The format for moves used in deliberation dialogues is shown in
Table 1, and the set of all moves meeting the format defined in Table 1 is denoted
M. Note that the system allows for other types of dialogues to be generated and these
might require the addition of extra moves. Also, Sender : M 7→ I is a function such
that Sender(〈Agent, Act, Content〉) = Agent.
We now informally explain the different types of move: an open move 〈x, open, γ〉
opens a dialogue to agree on an action to achieve the goal γ; an assert move 〈x, assert, A〉
asserts an argument A for or against an action to achieve a goal that is the topic of the
dialogue; an agree move 〈x, agree, a〉 indicates that x agrees to performing action a to
achieve the topic; a close move 〈x, close, γ〉 indicates that x wishes to end the dialogue.
A dialogue is simply a sequence of moves, each of which is made from one par-
ticipant to the other. As a dialogue progresses over time, we denote each timepoint by
a natural number. Each move is indexed by the timepoint when the move was made.
Exactly one move is made at each timepoint.
Definition 5: A dialogue, denoted Dt, is a sequence of moves [m1, . . . ,mt] involving
two participants in I = {1, 2}, where t ∈ N and the following conditions hold:
1. m1 is a move of the form 〈x, open, γ〉 where x ∈ I
2. Sender(ms) ∈ I for 1 ≤ s ≤ t
3. Sender(ms) 6= Sender(ms+1) for 1 ≤ s < t
The topic of the dialogue Dt is returned by Topic(Dt) = γ. The set of all dialogues is
denoted D.
The first move of a dialogue Dt must always be an open move (condition 1 of
the previous definition), every move of the dialogue must be made by a participant
(condition 2), and the agents take it in turns to send moves (condition 3). In order to
terminate a dialogue, either: two close moves must appear one immediately after the
other in the sequence (a matched-close); or two moves agreeing to the same action
must appear one immediately after the other in the sequence (an agreed-close).
Definition 6: Let Dt be a dialogue s.t. Topic(Dt) = γ. We say that ms (1 < s ≤ t), is
• a matched-close for Dt iff ms−1 = 〈x, close, γ〉 and ms = 〈x, close, γ〉.
• an agreed-close for Dt iff ms−1 = 〈x, agree, a〉 and ms = 〈x, agree, a〉.
We say Dt has a failed outcome iff mt is a matched-close, whereas we say Dt has a
successful outcome of a iff mt = 〈x, agree, a〉 is an agreed-close.
So a matched-close or an agreed-close will terminate a dialogue Dt but only if Dt
has not already terminated.
Definition 7: Let Dt be a dialogue. Dt terminates at t iff mt is a matched-close or an
agreed-close for Dt and ¬∃s s.t. s < t, Dt extends Ds (i.e. the first s moves of Dt are
the same as the sequence Ds) and Ds terminates at s.
We shortly give the particular protocol and strategy functions that allow agents to
generate deliberation dialogues. First, we introduce some subsidiary definitions. At any
point in a dialogue, an agent x can construct an iVAF from the union of the arguments
it can construct from its VATS and the arguments that have been asserted by the other
agent; we call this x’s dialogue iVAF.
Definition 8: A dialogue iVAF for an agent x participating in a dialogueDt is denoted
dVAF(x,Dt). If Dt is the sequence of moves = [m1, . . . ,mt], then dVAF(x,Dt) is the
iVAF 〈X ,A〉 where X = ArgsxTopic(Dt) ∪ {A | ∃mk = 〈x, assert, A〉(1 ≤ k ≤ t)}.
An action is agreeable to an agent x if and only if there is some argument for that
action that is acceptable in x’s dialogue iVAF under the audience that represents x’s
preference over values. Note that the set of actions that are agreeable to an agent may
change over the course of the dialogue.
Definition 9: An action a is agreeable in the iVAF 〈X ,A〉 under the audience Rx iff
∃A = 〈a, γ, v,+〉 ∈ X s.t. A is acceptable in 〈X ,A〉 under Rx. We denote the set
of all actions that are agreeable to an agent x participating in a dialogue Dt as
AgActs(x,Dt), s.t. a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt) iff a is agreeable in dVAF(x,Dt) under Rx.
A protocol is a function that returns the set of moves that are permissible for an
agent to make at each point in a particular type of dialogue. Here we give a deliberation
protocol. It takes the dialogue that the agents are participating in and the identifier of
the agent whose turn it is to move, and returns the set of permissible moves.
Definition 10: The deliberation protocol for agent x is a function Protocolx : D 7→
℘(M). Let Dt be a dialogue (1 ≤ t) with participants {1, 2} s.t. Sender(mt) = x and
Topic(Dt) = γ.
Protocolx(D
t) = P assx (D
t) ∪ P agx (D
t) ∪ {〈x, close, γ〉}
where the following are sets of moves and x′ ∈ {1, 2}.
P assx (D
t) = {〈x, assert, A〉 | Goal(A) = γ
and
¬∃mt′ = 〈x′, assert, A〉(1 < t′ ≤ t)
P agx (D
t) = {〈x, agree, a〉 | either
(1)mt = 〈x, agree, a〉}
else
(2)(∃mt′ = 〈x, assert, 〈a, γ, v,+〉〉(1 < t′ ≤ t)
and
( if ∃mt′′ = 〈x, agree, a〉)
then ∃A,mt′′′ = 〈x, assert, A〉
(t′′ < t′′′ ≤ t)))}
The protocol states that it is permissible to assert an argument as long as that argu-
ment has not previously been asserted in the dialogue. An agent can agree to an action
Strategyx(D
t) =


Pick(Sagx )(D
t) iff Sagx (Dt) 6= ∅
Pick(Spropx )(D
t) iff Sagx (Dt) = ∅ and Spropx (Dt) 6= ∅
Pick(Sattx )(D
t) iff Sagx (Dt) = Spropx (Dt) = ∅ and Sattx (Dt) 6= ∅
〈x, close,Topic(Dt)〉 iff Sagx (Dt) = Spropx (Dt) = Sattx (Dt) = ∅
where the choices for the moves are given by the following subsidiary functions (x′ ∈
{x, x},Topic(Dt) = γ):
Sagx (D
t) = {〈x, agree, a〉 ∈ P agx (D
t) | a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt)}
Spropx (D
t) = {〈x, assert, A〉 ∈ P assx (D
t) | A ∈ Argsxγ,Act(A) = a,Sign(A) = + and
a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt)}
Sattx (D
t) = {〈x, assert, A〉 ∈ P assx (D
t) | A ∈ Argsxγ,Act(A) = a,Sign(A) = −,
a 6∈ AgActs(x,Dt) and ∃mt′ = 〈x′, assert, A′〉
(1 ≤ t′ ≤ t) s.t. Act(A′) = a and Sign(A′) = +}
Fig. 1. The strategy function uniquely selects a move according to the following preference or-
dering (starting with the most preferred): an agree move (ag), a proposing assert move (prop), an
attacking assert move (att), a close move (close).
that has been agreed to by the other agent in the preceding move (condition 1 of P agx );
otherwise an agent x can agree to an action that has been proposed by the other par-
ticipant (condition 2 of P agx ) as long as if x has previously agreed to that action, then
x has since then asserted some new argument. This is because we want to avoid the
situation where an agent keeps repeatedly agreeing to an action that the other agent
will not agree to: if an agent makes a move agreeing to an action and the other agent
does not wish to also agree to that action, then the first agent must introduce some new
argument that may convince the second agent to agree before being able to repeat its
agree move. Agents may always make a close move. Note, it is straightforward to check
conformance with the protocol as it only refers to public elements of the dialogue.
We now define a basic deliberation strategy. It takes the dialogue Dt and returns
exactly one of the permissible moves. Note, this strategy makes use of a function Pick :
℘(M) 7→ M. We do not define Pick here but leave it as a parameter of our strategy
(in its simplest form Pick may return an arbitrary move from the input set); hence
our system could generate more than one dialogue depending on the definition of the
Pick function. In future work, we plan to design particular Pick functions; for example,
taking into account an agent’s perception of the other participant (more in section 5).
Definition 11: The basic strategy for an agent x is a function Strategyx : D 7→ M
given in Figure 1.
A well-formed deliberation dialogue is a dialogue that has been generated by two
agents each following the basic strategy.
Definition 12: A well-formed deliberation dialogue is a dialogueDt s.t. ∀t′ (1 ≤ t′ ≤
t), Sender(mt′) = x iff Strategyx(Dt
′
−1) = mt′
We now present a simple example. There are two participating agents ({1, 2}) who
have the joint goal to go out for dinner together (din). Ac1 ∪ Ac2 = {it, ch} (it: go to
an Italian restaurant; ch: go to a Chinese restaurant) and Av1 ∪ Av2 = {d, e1, e2, c}
(d: distance to travel; e1: agent 1’s enjoyment; e2: agent 2’s enjoyment; c: cost). The
agents’ audiences are as follows.
d 1 e1 1 c 1 e2
c 2 e2 2 e1 2 d
Agent 1 starts the dialogue.
m1 = 〈1, open, din〉
The agents’ dialogue iVAFs at this opening stage in the dialogue can be seen in Figs. 2
and 3, where the nodes represent arguments and are labelled with the action that they
are for (or the negation of the action that they are against) and the value that they are
motivated by. The arcs represent the attack relation between arguments, and a double
circle round a node means that the argument it represents is acceptable to that agent.
itit e1
c
it d
¬ch
e1
Fig. 2. Agent 1’s dialogue iVAF at t = 1, dVAF(1,D1).
e2
c ch
¬it
ch
e2
Fig. 3. Agent 2’s dialogue iVAF at t = 1, dVAF(2,D1).
At this point in the dialogue, there is only one argument for an action that is ac-
ceptable to 2 (〈ch, din, c,+〉), hence ch is the only action that is agreeable to 2. 2
must therefore assert an argument that it can construct for going to the Chinese restau-
rant. There are two such arguments that the Pick function could select (〈ch, din, c,+〉,
〈ch, din, e2,+〉). Let us assume that 〈ch, din, c,+〉 is selected.
m2 = 〈2, assert, 〈ch, din, c,+〉〉
This new argument is added to 1’s dialogue iVAF, to give dVAF(1, D2) (Fig. 4).
Although agent 2 has proposed going to the Chinese restaurant, this action is not
agreeable to agent 1 at this point in the dialogue (as there is no argument for this
action that is acceptable in Fig. 4). There is, however, an argument for the action it
(〈it, din, d,+〉) that is acceptable in 1’s dialogue iVAF (Fig. 4), and so going to the
Italian restaurant is agreeable to 1. Hence, 1 must make an assert move proposing
an argument for the action it, and there are three such arguments that the Pick func-
tion can select from (〈it, din, d,+〉, 〈it, din, c,+〉, 〈it, din, e1,+〉). Let us assume that
〈it, din, c,+〉 is selected.
itit
it
c
d
e1
¬ch e1
ch
c
Fig. 4. Agent 1’s dialogue iVAF at t = 2, dVAF(1,D2).
m3 = 〈1, assert, 〈it, din, c,+〉〉
This new argument is added to 2’s dialogue iVAF, to give dVAF(2, D3) (Fig. 5).
e2
¬it
ch
it
e2
c
chc
Fig. 5. Agent 2’s dialogue iVAF at t = 3, dVAF(2,D3).
Going to the Italian restaurant is now agreeable to agent 2 since the new argument
introduced promotes the value ranked most highly for agent 2, i.e. cost, and so this
argument is acceptable. So, 2 agrees to this action.
m4 = 〈2, agree, it〉
Going to the Italian restaurant is also agreeable to agent 1 (as the argument 〈it, din, d,+〉
is acceptable in its dialogue iVAF, which is still the same as that shown in Fig. 4 as 2
has not asserted any new arguments), hence 1 also agrees to this action.
m5 = 〈1, agree, it〉
Note that the dialogue has terminated successfully and the agents are each happy to
agree to go to the Italian restaurant; however, this action is agreeable to each agent for a
different reason. Agent 1 is happy to go to the Italian restaurant as it promotes the value
of distance to travel (the Italian restaurant is close by), whereas agent 2 is happy to go
to the Italian restaurant as it will promote the value of cost (as it is a cheap restaurant).
The agents need not be aware of one another’s audience in order to reach an agreement.
It is worth mentioning that, as we have left the Pick function unspecified, our strat-
egy could have generated a longer dialogue if, for example, agent 1 had instead chosen
to assert the argument 〈it, din, d,+〉 at the move m3. This illustrates how an agent’s
perception of the other participant may be useful: in the previous example agent 1 may
make the assumption that, as agent 2 has previously asserted an argument that promotes
cost, cost is something that agent 2 values; or an agent may use its perception of another
agent’s personality to guide argument selection [11].
Another point to note concerns the arguments generated by CQ10. Such arguments
do not dispute that the action should be performed, but do dispute the reasons as to
why, and so they are modelled as attacks despite being for the same action. Pinpointing
this distinction here is important for two main reasons. Firstly, an advantage of the
argumentation approach is that agents make explicit the reasons as to why they agree
and disagree about the acceptability of arguments, and the acceptability may well turn
on such reasons. Where there are two arguments proposed for the same action but each
is based upon different values, an agent may only accept the argument based on one of
the values. Hence such arguments are seen to be in conflict. Secondly, by participating
in dialogues agents reveal what their value orderings are, as pointed out in [12]. If
an agent will accept an argument for action based upon one particular value but not
another, then this is potentially useful information for future dialogue interactions; if
agreement is not reached about a particular action proposal, then dialogue participants
will know the values an opposing agent cares about and this can guide the selection of
further actions to propose, as we discuss later on in section 5.
A final related issue to note is that of accrual of arguments. If there are multiple
arguments for an action and the values promoted are acceptable to the agents then some
form of accrual might seem desirable. However, the complex issue of how best to accrue
such arguments has not been fully resolved and this is not the focus here.
4 Properties
Certainly (assuming the cooperative agents do not abandon the dialogue for some rea-
son), all dialogues generated by our system terminate. This is clear as we assume that
the sets of actions and values available to an agent are finite, hence the set of arguments
that an agent can construct is also finite. As the protocol does not allow the agents
to keep asserting the same argument, or to keep agreeing to the same action unless a
new argument has been asserted, either the dialogue will terminate successfully else the
agents will run out of legal assert and agree moves and so each will make a close move.
Proposition 1: If Dt is a well-formed deliberation dialogue, then ∃t′ (t ≤ t′) s.t. Dt′ is
a well-formed deliberation dialogue that terminates at t′ and Dt′ extends Dt.
It is also the clear from the definition of the strategy (which only allows an action to
be agreed to if that action is agreeable to the agent) that if the dialogue terminates with
a successful outcome of action a, then a is agreeable to both agents.
Proposition 2: If Dt is a well-formed deliberation dialogue that terminates successfully
at t with outcome a, then a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt) and a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt).
Similarly, we can show that if there is an action that is agreeable to both agents
when the dialogue terminates, then the dialogue will terminate successfully. In order to
show this, however, we need a subsidiary lemma that states: if an agent makes a close
move, then any arguments that it can construct that are for actions that it finds agreeable
must have been asserted by one of the agents during the dialogue. This follows from
the definition of the strategy, which only allows agents to make a close move once they
have exhausted all possible assert moves.
av1
v2
v3
a
v4
a
¬a
action a agreeable toaction a agreeable to
   agent 2 due to v2 agent 1 due to v3
Fig. 6. The joint iVAF
Lemma 1: Let Dt be a well-formed deliberation dialogue with Topic(Dt) = γ, s.t.
mt = 〈x, close, γ〉 and dVAF(x,Dt) = 〈X ,A〉. If A = 〈a, γ, v,+〉 ∈ X and a ∈
AgActs(x,Dt), then ∃mt′ = 〈x′, assert, A, 〉 (1 < t′ ≤ t, x′ ∈ {x, x}).
Now we show that if there is an action that is agreeable to both agents when the
dialogue terminates, then the dialogue will have a successful outcome.
Proposition 3: Let Dt be a well-formed deliberation dialogue that terminates at t. If
a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt) and a ∈ AgActs(x,Dt), then Dt terminates successfully.
Proof: Assume that Dt terminates unsuccessfully at t and that Sender(mt) = x. From
Lemma 1, there is at least one argument A for a that has been asserted by one of the
agents. There are two cases. Case 1: x asserted A. Case 2: x asserted A.
Case 1: x asserted A. Hence (from the protocol) it would have been legal for x to
make the move mt = 〈x, agree, a〉 (in which case x would have had to replied with
an agree, giving successful termination), unless x had previously made a move mt′ =
〈x, agree, a〉 but had not made a move mt′′ = 〈x, assert, A〉 with t′ < t′′ < t. How-
ever, if this were the case, then we would have AgActs(x,Dt′) = AgActs(x,Dt)
(because no new arguments have been put forward by x to change x’s dialogue iVAF),
hence x would have had to respond to the move mt′ with an agree, terminating the
dialogue successfully. Hence contradiction.
Case 2: works equivalently to case 1. Hence, Dt terminates successfully. 2
We have shown then: all dialogues terminate; if a dialogue terminates successfully,
then the outcome will be agreeable to both participants; if a dialogue terminates and
there is some action that is agreeable to both agents, then the dialogue will have a
successful outcome.
It would be desirable to show that if there is some action that is agreeable in the
joint iVAF, which is the iVAF that can be constructed from the union of the agents’
arguments (i.e. the iVAF 〈X ,A〉, where X = Argsxγ ∪ Argsxγ and γ is the topic of the
dialogue), then the dialogue will terminate successfully. However, there are some cases
where there is an action that is agreeable in the joint iVAF to each of the participants
and yet still they may not reach an agreement. Consider the following example in which
there is an action a that is agreeable to both the agents given the joint iVAF (see Fig.6)
and yet the dialogue generated here terminates unsuccessfully.
The participants ({1, 2}) have the following audiences.
v3 1 v1 1 v4 1 v2
v2 2 v1 2 v4 2 v3
Agent 1 starts the dialogue.
m1 = 〈1, open, p〉
The agents’ dialogue iVAFs at this stage in the dialogue can be seen in Figs. 7 and 8.
v2
a
¬a
v1
Fig. 7. Agent 1’s dialogue iVAF at t = 1, dVAF(1,D1).
a
v3
a
v4
Fig. 8. Agent 2’s dialogue iVAF at t = 1, dVAF(2,D1).
At this point in the dialogue, there is one action that is agreeable to agent 2 (a,
as there is an argument for a that is acceptable in Fig. 8); hence (following the basic
dialogue strategy), agent 2 must assert one of the arguments that it can construct for
a (either 〈a, p, v3,+〉 or 〈a, p, v4,+〉). Recall, we have not specified the Pick function
that has to choose between these two possible proposing assert moves. Let us assume
that the Pick function makes an arbitrary choice to assert 〈a, p, v4,+〉.
m2 = 〈2, assert, 〈a, p, v4,+〉〉
This new argument is added to agent 1’s dialogue iVAF, to give dVAF(1, D2) (Fig. 9).
a
v2
a v4
¬a
v1
Fig. 9. Agent 1’s dialogue iVAF at t = 2, dVAF(1,D2).
From Fig. 9, we see that the only argument that is now acceptable to agent 1 is the
argument against a (〈a, p, v1,−〉), hence there are no actions that are agreeable to agent
1. Thus agent 1 must make an attacking assert move.
m3 = 〈1, assert, 〈a, p, v1,−〉〉
This new argument is added to agent 2’s dialogue iVAF, to give dVAF(2, D3) (Fig. 10).
We see from Fig. 10 that the only argument that is now acceptable to agent 2 is the
argument against a that 1 has just asserted (〈a, p, v1,−〉); hence, a is now no longer
an agreeable action for agent 2. As there are now no actions that are agreeable to agent
v1
a
v4¬a
a
v3
Fig. 10. Agent 2’s dialogue iVAF at t = 3, dVAF(2, D3).
2, it cannot make any proposing assert moves. It also cannot make any attacking assert
moves, as the only argument that it can construct against an action has already been
asserted by agent 1. Hence, agent 2 makes a close move.
m4 = 〈2, close, p〉
Thus, the dialogue iVAF for 1 is still the same as that which appears in Fig. 9. As there
are no actions that are agreeable to agent 1, it cannot make any proposing assert moves.
It cannot make any attacking assert moves, as the only argument that it can construct
against an action has already been asserted. Hence, agent 1 also makes a close move.
m5 = 〈1, close, p〉
The dialogue has thus terminated unsuccessfully and the agents have not managed to
reach an agreement as to how to achieve the goal p. However, we can see that if the Pick
function instead selected the argument 〈a, p, v3,+〉 for agent 2 to assert for the move
m2, then the resulting dialogue would have led to a successful outcome.
This example then illustrates a particular problem: the arguments exist that will
enable the agents to reach an agreement (we can see this in the joint iVAF, Fig. 6,
in which each agent finds a agreeable) and yet the particular arguments selected by
the Pick function may not allow agreement to be reached. The choice of moves made
in a deliberation dialogue affects the dialogue outcome; hence, strategic manoeuvring
within the dialogue is possible in order to try to influence the dialogue outcome.
This evaluation helps us to understand the complex issues and difficulties involved
in allowing agents with different preferences to agree how to act. We discuss possible
responses to some of these difficulties in the next section.
5 Proposed extensions
One way in which we could aim to avoid the problem illustrated in the previous example
is by allowing agents to develop a model of which values they believe are important to
the other participant. This model can then be used by the Pick function in order to select
arguments that are more likely to lead to agreement (i.e. those that the agent believes
promote or demote values that are highly preferred by the other participant). Consider
the above example, if agent 2 believed that value v3 was more preferred to agent 1
than value v4, then 2 would have instead asserted 〈a, p, v3,+〉 for the move m2, which
would have led to a successful outcome.
Therefore, the first extension that we plan to investigate is to design a particularPick
function that takes into account what values the agent believes are important to the other
participant. We also plan to develop a mechanism which allows the agent to build up
its model of the other participant, based on the other participant’s dialogue behaviour;
for example, if an agent x asserts an argument for an action a because it promotes a
particular value v, and the other participant x does not then agree to a, agent x may
have reason to believe that x does not highly rank the value v.
Another problem that may be faced with our dialogue system is when it is not pos-
sible for the agents to come to an agreement no matter which arguments they choose
to assert. The simplest example of this is when each agent can only construct one argu-
ment to achieve the topic p: agent 1 can construct 〈a1, p, v1,+〉; agent 2 can construct
〈a2, p, v2,+〉. Now if agent 1’s audience is such that it prefers v1 to v2 and agent 2’s
audience is such that it prefers v2 to v1, then the agents will not be able to reach an
agreement with the dialogue system that we have proposed here; this is despite the fact
that both agents do share the goal of coming to some agreement on how to act to achieve
p. The agents in this case have reached an impasse, where there is no way of finding an
action that is agreeable to both agents given their individual preferences over the values.
The second extension that we propose to investigate aims to overcome such an im-
passe when agreement is nevertheless necessary. We plan to define a new type of di-
alogue (which could be embedded within the deliberation dialogue we have defined
here) that allows the agents to discuss their preferences over the values and to suggest
and agree to compromises that allow them to arrive at an agreement in the deliberation
dialogue. For example, if agent 1’s audience is v1 1 v2 1 v3 and agent 2’s audience
is v3 2 v2 2 v1, then they may both be willing to switch their first and second most
preferred values if this were to lead to an agreement (i.e. giving v2 1 v1 1 v3 and
v2 2 v3 2 v1).
We would also like to extend our system to deal with the situation in which the
other stages of practical reasoning (problem formulation and epistemic reasoning) may
be flawed. In [5], an approach to dealing with epistemic reasoning was presented, that
allowed an embedded inquiry subdialogue with which agents could jointly reason epis-
temically about the state of the world. Thus, the third extension that we propose is to
develop a new type of dialogue that will allow agents to jointly reason about the ele-
ments of a VATS in order to consider possible flaws in the problem formulation stage.
6 Related Work
There is existing work in the literature on argumentation that bears some relation to
what we have presented here, though the aims and contributions of these approaches
are markedly different.
Our proposal follows the approach in [5, 13] but the types of moves are different,
and the protocol and strategy functions are substantially altered from those presented
in either [5] or [13]. This alteration is necessary as neither of [5, 13] allow agents to
participate in deliberation dialogues. In [13], a dialogue system is presented for epis-
temic inquiry dialogues; it allows agents to jointly construct argument graphs (where
the arguments refer only to beliefs) and to use a shared defeat relation to determine the
acceptability of particular arguments.
The proposal of [5] is closer to that presented here, as both are concerned with
how to act. However, the dialogue system in [5] does not allow deliberation dialogues
as the outcome of any dialogue that it generates is predetermined by the union of the
participating agents’ knowledge. Rather, the dialogues of [5] are better categorised as a
joint inference; they ensure that the agents assert all arguments that may be relevant to
the question of how to act, after which a universal value ordering is applied to determine
the outcome. As a shared universal value ordering is used in [5], there is an objective
view of the “best” outcome (being that which you would get if you pooled the agents’
knowledge and applied the shared ordering); this is in contrast to the dialogue system we
present here, where the “best” outcome is subjective and depends on the point of view
of a particular agent. As the agents presented here each have their own distinct audience,
they must come to an explicit agreement about how to act (hence the introduction of
an agree move) despite the fact that their internal views of argument acceptability may
conflict. Also, here we define the attack relation (in the iVAF), which takes account of
the relevant CQs, whilst in [5] the attack relation is only informally discussed.
Deliberation dialogues have only been considered in detail by the authors of [2, 3].
Unlike in our work, in [2] the evaluation of arguments is not done in terms of argumen-
tation frameworks, and strategies for reaching agreement are not considered; and in [3]
the focus is on goal selection and planning.
In [12] issues concerning audiences in argumentation frameworks are addressed
where the concern is to find particular audiences (if they exist) for which some ar-
guments are acceptable and others are not. Also considered is how preferences over
values emerge through a dialogue; this is demonstrated by considering how two agents
can make moves within a dialogue where both are dealing with the same joint graph.
However, the graph can be seen as a static structure within which agents are playing
moves, i.e. putting forward acceptable arguments, rather than constructing a graph that
is not complete at the outset, as in the approach we have presented.
There is also some work that considers how Dungian argumentation frameworks
associated with individual agents can be merged together [14]. The merging is done not
through taking the union of the individual frameworks, but through the application of
criteria that determine when arguments and attacks between them can be merged into a
larger graph. The main goal of the work is to characterise the sets of arguments accept-
able by the whole group of agents using notions of joint acceptability, which include
voting methods. In our work we are not interested in merging individual agent’s graphs
per se; rather, an agent develops its own individual graph and uses this to determine if
it finds an action agreeable. In [14] no dialogical interactions are considered, and it is
also explicitly noted that consideration has not been given to how the merging approach
can be applied to value-based argument systems.
Prakken [15] considers how agents can come to a public agreement despite their
internal views of argument acceptability conflicting, allowing them to make explicit
attack and surrender moves. However, Prakken does not explicitly consider value-based
arguments, nor does he discuss particular strategies.
Strategic argumentation has been considered in other work. For example, in [16] a
dialogue game for persuasion is presented that is based upon one originally proposed
in [1] but makes use of Dungian argumentation frameworks. Scope is provided for
three strategic considerations which concern: revealing inconsistencies between an op-
ponent’s commitments and his beliefs; exploiting the opponent’s reasoning so as to
create such inconsistencies; and revealing blunders to be avoided in expanding the op-
ponent’s knowledge base. These strategies all concern reasoning about an opponent’s
beliefs, as opposed to reasoning about action proposals with subjective preferences, as
done in our work, and the game in [16] is of an adversarial nature, whereas our setting
is more co-operative.
One account that does consider strategies when reasoning with value-based argu-
ments is given in [7], where the objective is to create obligations on the opponent to ac-
cept some argument based on his previously expressed preferences. The starting point
for such an interaction is a fixed joint VAF, shared by the dialogue participants. In our
approach the information is not centralised in this manner, the argument graphs are built
up as the dialogue proceeds, we do not assume perfect knowledge of the other agent’s
graph and preferences, and our dialogues have a more co-operative nature.
A related new area that is starting to receive attention is the application of game
theory to argumentation (e.g. [17]). This work has investigated situations under which
rational agents will not have any incentive to lie about or hide arguments; although this
is concerned mainly with protocol design, it appears likely that such work will have
implications for strategy design.
A few works do explicitly consider the selection of dialogue targets, that is the
selection of a particular previous move to respond to. In [15] a move is defined as
relevant if its target would (if attacked) cause the status of the original move to change;
properties of dialogues are considered where agents are restricted to making relevant
moves. In [18] this is built on to consider other classes of move relevance and the space
that agents then have for strategic manoeuvring. However, these works only investigate
properties of the dialogue protocols; they do not consider particular strategies for such
dialogues as we do here.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a dialogue system for joint deliberation where the agents involved
in the decision making may each have different preferences yet all want an agreement
to be reached. We defined how arguments and critiques are generated and evaluated,
and how this is done within the context of a dialogue. A key aspect concerns how
agents’ individual reasoning fits within a more global context, without the requirement
to completely merge all knowledge. We presented some properties of our system that
show when agreement can be guaranteed, and have explored why an agreement may
not be reached. Identifying such situations is crucial for conflict resolution and we have
discussed how particular steps can be taken to try to reach agreement when this occurs.
In future work we intend to give a fuller account of such resolution steps whereby
reasoning about other agents’ preferences is central.
Ours is the first work to provide a dialogue strategy that allows agents with different
preferences to come to an agreement as to how to act. The system allows strategi-
cal manoeuvring in order to influence the dialogue outcome, thus laying the important
foundations needed to understand how strategy design affects dialogue outcome when
the preferences involved are subjective.
—
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